

## Program MAMPU

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The experience of  
parliamentary  
engagement by MAMPU  
and its partners:

# Lessons learnt and openings for the future

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## Executive Summary

This study was commissioned to conduct a stock-taking of how MAMPU and its partners have engaged with parliament, including how MAMPU's distinctive approach has evolved, the lessons learnt and the priorities for the coming period. This exercise was preceded by a political economy analysis of the incentives that shape the behaviour of parliamentarians to help identify the openings for parliamentary engagement. A series of in-depth interviews with DPR and DPRD members and with MAMPU partners were conducted. The interview data was analysed in the context of the author's expertise as a former parliamentary official, scholar and legislative development adviser.

The key finding of the study is that MAMPU's approach to parliamentary engagement has evolved since the inception of the project in 2012, with changes occurring organically as MAMPU partners have developed their own distinctive modes of work and diverse relationships with parliament. This is in the spirit of MAMPU's design as a project driven by partners themselves, with the managing contractor to "facilitate and support rather than direct initiative activities". The managing contractor provided strategic direction, including broadening parliamentary engagement to all partners and encouraging sharing of experience.

The original conception of parliamentary work as a separate "component" alongside the thematic areas gave way to an approach where engagement with parliamentarians has been an integral part of the achievement of each theme's objective. Parliament is no longer seen a parallel "stream" of activities but a channel of voice and influence for MAMPU partners and the women they work with. Along with that new conception came a realisation that women's caucuses would not be the primary entry point into parliament. Caucuses may be partners in specific cases, but generally they do not operate effectively as vehicles for the political empowerment of women parliamentarians and constituents. MAMPU partners' successes have largely been achieved through direct engagement with decision-makers in parliamentary committees and party caucuses (*fraksi*), and with individual political actors.

MAMPU partners have developed a rich diversity of modes of parliamentary engagement which match their particular objectives, individual strengths and connections with the DPR and/or DPRD. For example, Migrant Care assisted the passage of the national law on migrant workers and Komnas Perempuan and FPL continue to engage with the DPR on the bill on sexual violence. In other cases, partners' activities on thematic issues at the regional level, such as Aisyiyah's work on women's health, link together case-based work with lobbying of DPRD to both pass *perda* on women's services and allocate funding for women's services in the APBD. BAKTI has developed an innovative approach to DPRD constituent relations known as the "*reses partisipatif*" which connects women MPs in a mutually-beneficial relationship with local communities. All of these modes are founded on the multi-stakeholder coalitions advocated in the original MAMPU design.

This study concludes that MAMPU should broadly continue its current approach, both because it follows MAMPU's foundational principles and because it has been successful. This means that strengthening voice and influence through parliament and the empowerment of women parliamentarians should be seen as two sides of the one coin. Engagement should focus on key decision-making bodies within parliament such as committees and *fraksi*, with women's caucuses involved if appropriate. Within that broad conclusion, the study makes a range of recommendations about the way in which MAMPU should operate in the coming period.



- *Broaden parliamentary engagement across MAMPU partners.* Give attention to cross-sharing amongst MAMPU partners so that a greater number become more deeply involved in parliamentary engagement, making use of experience and approaches from other partners. This will contribute to the sustainability of MAMPU parliamentary approaches and networks post-MAMPU, including if further DFAT funding is made available.
- *Extend replication of *reses partisipatif*.* This particularly interesting mode of parliamentary engagement is already being replicated to some other MAMPU partners. The methodology should be extended to a broader range of partners and information about it shared more widely outside MAMPU.
- *Convene a second parliamentary conference.* A conference held after the inauguration of the new parliament will be a forum for cross-partner sharing to broaden parliamentary engagement. It will also be an opportunity for MAMPU partners to invite re-elected and first-time parliamentarians (and their staff) and draw them into supportive networks for both MAMPU-sponsored and post-MAMPU activities.
- *Context is critical.* Broadening parliamentary engagement across MAMPU partners is not a matter of copying blue-prints. Each mode of engagement has been developed within a specific context: according to the issue involved and its political ramifications; the timing of developments; the relevant institutions and actors; which of MAMPU's objectives are involved; and the strengths and capacity of the particular MAMPU partner. What works in one time and place may be more difficult in another.
- *But some elements of context are consistent.* Although context is generally fluid, there are some relatively consistent parliamentary entry points.
  - Parliamentary committees are generally more important than *fraksi* because most key policy decisions are made in committees.
  - DPR/D initiative bills usually provide more scope for outside influence than government bills.
  - Allies in any parliamentary process will usually coalesce around a few key individuals.
  - Parliamentarians must simultaneously be engaged during formal processes and through informal interactions.
- *Think politically.* Electoral and parliamentary politics are deeply flawed, but this does not mean that there are no openings for engagement. To ensure that all modes of parliamentary engagement are contextual, partners should analyse the political dynamics around a particular issue, including potential allies and opponents, so that parliamentarians are approached in a way that responds to the incentives identified in the political economy study.
- *Expand work with parliamentary oversight.* MAMPU has made progress in supporting the creation of a range of policy instruments, including legislation and regulations, as well as executive policy tools such as SK. These have created expanding opportunities to build upon this policy influence by working with DPR/Ds as they use their authority to oversee the implementation of policy by executive government.
- *Develop training on BPJS.* Requests for assistance on BPJS is the growth area for parliamentarians' constituency relations work. As a major issue for MAMPU, this represents an opportunity to train MPs and community groups on the challenges of providing BPJS services at the community level.
- *2019 elections present challenges and opportunities.* During the lead-up to the 2019 elections and in the post-election period there will be challenges such as getting parliamentarians to focus on MAMPU issues, but new opportunities such as mentoring and technical assistance for women candidates and parliamentarians to build networks after the inauguration of the new parliament.

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Background

Engagement with parliament at the national and region level is a key aspect of the activities of MAMPU and its partners. This study was commissioned by MAMPU as part of this work, in response to an identified need to carry out a stock-take of MAMPU's parliamentary engagement to date and to identify openings and priorities in the coming period. The following paper the first of two:

- The objective of the first study was to identify the incentives to which members of parliament have to respond when they are elected and re-elected to office, and as they carry out their roles as parliamentarians.
- The objective of this second study is to examine how MAMPU and its partners have previously engaged with parliament, what modes of engagement have been used, the lessons that have been learnt, and what new and continuing openings for parliamentary work can be identified.

## 1.2. Methodology

The methodology is based on the analysis of a range of sources of data. Qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted with 25 serving or former DPR members, DPRD members and parliamentarians' staff, in addition to discussions with activists from MAMPU partner organisations and a number of observers of parliamentary affairs. Interviews were held in Jakarta and a number of regional centres from March to May 2018. Interviews were designed to be interactive discussions centred on a common core set of questions, but with discussion flowing according to the institutional perspectives and personal views of the informants. Core questions for parliamentary actors included: informants' assessment of their experience of engagement with CSOs, including MAMPU partner organisations; examples of success and failure in parliamentary-CSO engagement and lessons learnt; the respective importance of various internal parliamentary bodies; the issues facing women in politics; the role of women's caucuses; relations with constituents, including special initiatives such as *reses partisipatif*; the challenges of electoral campaigns; and open questions about the challenges facing parliamentarians.

Questions to MAMPU partners focused on: their experience with engaging parliament, including successes, failures and lessons learnt; their past and planned program activities and approaches; challenges for future parliamentary engagement and ideas for MAMPU's future activities. Input from the interviews was combined with data, analysis and theoretical perspectives from an in-depth study of the scholarly literature on Indonesian and international parliamentary politics and women's empowerment, as well as studies produced by international agencies and CSOs. In addition, the study was informed by the author's knowledge in the field of parliamentary affairs and legislative engagement, acquired over more than two decades as a parliamentary official, scholar and practitioner in international development.

# 2. The evolution of MAMPU's parliamentary engagement

## 2.1. From "component" to "stream"

MAMPU's interaction with parliament has undergone a process of gradual evolution from the time of the program's inception in mid-2012. Significant changes have occurred in the way in



which the managers of the program have contextualised MAMPU's parliamentary work within the program's broader objectives of improving poor women's access to government services. These changes were reflected in an evolution of the language used to describe parliamentary activities. Parliamentary work was first conceptualised in the 2013 MAMPU design for working with parliamentarians (MAMPU 2013a), in which parliamentary work was seen as one of two "components", in line with the language of the original MAMPU design document. Component One consisted of support to partners' work in MAMPU's five thematic areas and Component Two was support for partners' work with women's parliamentary caucuses and gender advocate male parliamentarians to mobilise their advocacy for reform. This implied that parliamentary cooperation, though supporting work in the thematic areas, comprised a separate set of activities. Indeed, this was reflected in the fact that responsibility for Component Two was assigned to one partner, BAKTI.

While the term "component" was still used for the May 2014 Annual Work Plan for 2014-15, the term "parliamentary stream" was used in the April 2014 Implementation Strategy (MAMPU 2014a). This change arose from a realisation that the close connection between parliamentary activities and other partner activities meant that the former should be seen as a "stream" that flowed through all MAMPU's work and "not a stand-alone parliamentary strengthening program". There remained, however, lack of clarity about this in practice – while the Implementation Strategy argued that parliamentary work was "integral to MAMPU as a whole", it also spoke of parliamentary work "complementing" other activities. And, in line with the original MAMPU Program Design, the Strategy illustrated a logic model with two parallel sets of activities leading to interacting but separate "short term outcomes" and "medium term outcomes" that only met in the "long-term outcomes" in five to seven years hence (MAMPU 2014a: 15).

There was thus ambiguity about the main orientation of the parliamentary component/stream and how it should operate – different interpretations were applied at different times. Sometimes the focus appeared to be capacity-building for women parliamentarians, including promoting their entry into leadership roles – usually with the addendum that gender-sensitive male MPs should also be targeted. At other times, MAMPU conceptualised the goal of parliamentary activities to be to provide an "anchor" in parliament for MAMPU partners working in the five thematic areas, an understanding which would not necessarily lead to a predominant focus on female MPs and their needs. A case could be made these objectives were not always incompatible, but there remained some tension between them. Whatever the goal, a key element was the idea that women's caucuses would be the principal instrument for activities, the entry point into parliament, and the partner for capacity-building support for women parliamentarians.

## 2.2. The parliamentary conference

The parliamentary conference held in May 2015 created further impetus for the integration of parliamentary engagement into the activities of all MAMPU partners. The conference brought together parliamentarians, CSOs and government representatives to discuss issues relating to MAMPU thematic areas and ended with the signing of a joint commitment by DPRD's and MAMPU partners to promote gender-sensitive policies and services. The conference facilitated this in a practical way by creating networks and relationships between parliamentarians and MAMPU partners in their respective thematic areas. For example, Aisyiyah invited a DPRD member from Demak district in Central Java to the conference and reported that, as a result, she became very supportive of their work in the district. This enabled Aisyiyah to later mobilise her support as chair of the DPRD's health commission to help make

the case for expanding the provision of the reproductive health services in which Aisiyiyah had been involved, but which had been under threat of funding cut-backs. Across the spectrum of MAMPU partners, engagement with parliaments increased after the conference, which MAMPU saw as evidence that the “strategy of broadening parliamentary engagement through [the conference] had worked” (MAMPU Progress Report 2016:8).

### 2.3. From “stream” to “channel of influence”

The example of Aisiyiyah’s mobilisation of the influence of a parliamentarian at a critical time illustrated a point that was becoming clearer: that parliamentary engagement was not only linked with other MAMPU work, but could be essential to it. Increasingly, the activities of MAMPU partners showed that parliamentary engagement was not only complementary but was crucial to the achievements of their objectives. This was mostly evident in the advocacy work undertaken by Migrant Care, lobbying members of the DPR on the draft legislation on migrant workers. Migrant Care developed close relations with the chair of the relevant DPR *komisi* and cooperated closely with the working committee drafting the bill, providing input on the DIMs and the wording of clauses. Passage of the bill was a major step forward for one of MAMPU’s target groups, female migrant workers, and would not have been possible without close engagement with parliament.

As MAMPU has evolved, engagement between partners and parliament has increasingly taken the form of advocacy, lobbying and cooperative activities. While direct assistance to parliamentarians has continued, it has been overtaken by other forms of engagement, as partners have developed their own particular way of working with parliamentarians. In recognition of this reality, MAMPU reports from early 2015 stopped referring to parliamentary work as a “stream”, and parliamentary engagement was reported on as a “channel of influence”. There was increasing engagement by partners at the provincial and district level, including formal activities such as public hearings and *audiensi* and various informal types of interaction with parliamentarians. All of this made redundant the original idea of using women’s caucuses as the main entry point, as discussed in more detail in section 5.4.

### 2.4. Role of the managing contractor

MAMPU’s managing contractor, Cowater International, has played a leading role in the evolution of the program’s parliamentary engagement. MAMPU was designed with the conception that the managing contractor would “facilitate and support rather than direct initiative activities” (MAMPU 2012b: 25). The managing contractor initially expended some effort attempting to operationalise a separate component for parliamentary activities and a focus of women’s caucus, two features of the program design that, as mentioned above, were not well-defined. A number of papers were commissioned that, in the end, did not actually have very much impact on the character of MAMPU’s parliamentary engagement. As a number of MAMPU partners began to report their interaction with parliament it became clear that they were developing their own modes of engagement appropriate for their thematic area and their parliamentary connections. By 2015 the managing contractor was therefore developing a new approach based on the “need to integrate the original two MAMPU program components ... in a united strategy” that “facilitated a more coherent approach to policy, appreciating the need for engagement with parliamentarians ... by all MAMPU partners” (MAMPU Forward Plan 2016-20: 6-2). The convening of the May 2015 parliamentary conference played a particularly important role in articulating and disseminating the conception that all partners should be involved in parliamentary engagement, not just one or two working on a separate component.

The managing contractor has since played a strategic role in providing support to partners' individual parliamentary interaction, while also facilitating broader engagement amongst partners and cross-partner learning. For example, it recognised the potential embedded in the *reses partisipatif* methodology and encouraged its replication from BAKTI to FPL, a development which this study recommends should be further extended. The recruitment of thematic coordinators in the MAMPU office has enabled communication with, and oversight of, partners' activities and was complemented by the appointment of a parliamentary thematic coordinator to encourage a cross-thematic approach to work with parliament. The parliamentary thematic coordinator has worked to ensure partners develop priorities for advocacy amongst the multiple identified needs for new regulations to be passed by parliaments, primarily at the sub-national level. The MAMPU reporting database (MANIS) is used to identify patterns in the intensity of parliamentary interaction by individual partners over time.

### 3. Key themes emerging from the interviews

Against the background of the evolution of MAMPU's approach since 2012, this study conducted interviews with 25 parliamentary actors (former and serving members of parliament and their staff) to canvass views and suggestions about parliament's engagement with external organisations such as MAMPU partners. The following section is not designed to be a summary of those interviews, but aims to highlight themes raised by the informants that shed light on the objective of developing MAMPU's parliamentary engagement in the coming period.

#### 3.1. Good quality, timely and targeted input from CSOs is valuable

There was universal agreement from the parliamentary informants that they valued inputs received from CSOs and external organisations in general. They were appreciated as sources of data, information and opinion which broadened and enriched their understanding of issues. A number of informants stressed that such input was often the main source of information not coming from government and thus provided a balance to official views which tend to predominate in parliamentary proceedings. It could be helpful if CSOs "challenged their thinking", injected fresh ideas and pushed politicians to see issues from a range of points of view. Different perspectives from CSOs reflected the diversity of community views and could be helpful as warnings to parliamentarians about possible political risks and unintended consequences in legislation or other actions by parliament.

But not all interactions with CSOs were regarded as equally valuable. At worst, some CSOs were seen as not being interested in constructive dialogue, but as only wanting to "exploit the issue", create "*rame-rame*", make demands or hold aggressive demonstrations. Even with interactions that were potentially more positive, some CSOs seemed ineffective for different reasons. In certain cases CSOs did not appear to understand even elementary aspects of parliamentary process, such as the appropriate committee or party caucus to approach. Sometimes CSOs provided input that was not useful for those involved in parliamentary proceedings – many informants emphasised that they were most likely use outside input if it was timely, well-targeted and packaged appropriately. "Give us something we can work with", in one informant's words. For example, if draft legislation was at the stage of detailed discussions of DIM in a *panja*, then CSOs should target key members of the *panja* rather than lobbying indiscriminately. They should provide practical suggestions such as alternative wording for specific clauses, and avoid the repetition of general policy arguments. One informant mentioned a case where

a CSO proposed a large number of detailed and technical clauses for a bill when such issues were more appropriately placed in implementing regulations, not in the law. By doing so they showed that they did not understand the legislative process.

It was clear that members of parliament regarded personal approaches and ongoing relationships with CSOs as important. The most effective CSOs were those that had a reputation for a “problem-solving” approach. One informant looked for CSO relationships where there was “trust and comfort”, in other words CSOs whose data was reliable, who could be trusted not to misuse information, and where both sides understood the others’ way of working. But at the same time, CSOs needed to understand that all political relationships were opportunistic and contextual. CSOs might be welcomed by a legislator at certain times because openings for a mutually beneficial interchange existed, but later they might find it hard to get a response from the same individual because events had moved on. One informant observed that CSOs may have an “emotional bond” with particular issues or victims and think that because parliamentarians are more detached they don’t care. But parliamentarians have to deal with a multitude of issues and can help provide solutions if they receive the right kind of outside support.

This related to a general theme repeatedly mentioned by informants: that CSOs needed to learn to think politically and to intervene in the political process in ways that responded to the ebb and flow of developments. Politics changes rapidly and CSOs are likely to be well received if they can provide something to a member of parliament that relates to current debates. For example, the intense engagement with parliament by an organisation like Migrant Care during the drafting of the law on migrant workers would only last as long as the legislation was under review. The respect and trust engendered by that contact could be important in later approaches, but it would not necessarily guarantee continued access. The main exception to this is when members of parliament have some organisational, religious or political affiliation with a particular CSO, in which case they may be more responsive. One informant made the observation that members of parliament are most likely to respond positively to external input if they are able to physically see the problem involved or to observe a particular program in action in the field. This comment was made in the context of local politics where the informant considered that the capacity of local parliamentarians to think abstractly was lower and where many issues involved physical infrastructure.

One politically-related issue that informants repeatedly returned to was the reality that members of parliament are driven by the need for publicity and profile, without which they cannot be re-elected. As one parliamentarian expressed it: “there’s no use getting a hole-in-one if no-one sees it”. CSOs should frame issues in a way that allows members of parliament to see the political advantage in supporting what CSOs are advocating. Such an approach may outweigh the “political risks” that one informant said can come from being publicly associated with some CSOs. A couple of interviewees suggested that CSOs should build connections with members of parliament by inviting them to speak at public events covered by the media because politicians “crave media attention”. This can build trust and provide opportunities to influence thinking. Of course, the reverse can apply: one informant said that they were easily bored with large public events where one had to listen to people make statements just to be seen, while they valued individual meetings where real problems could be discussed and suggestions for solutions provided by CSOs.



### 3.2. Parliamentary engagement with CSOs is varied and highly contextual

The inherently political nature of interviewees' attitudes towards parliamentary engagement meant that their responses highlighted the variety of interaction with CSOs and its highly contextual character. They mentioned working with outside organisations for a variety of reasons that were shaped by the diversity of their roles as politicians. The most frequent mention of CSO input was in relation to law-making where, as mentioned above, it was highly valued when it contributed to resolving problems during drafting, but was seen as unhelpful if its objective was just public posturing. Legislation was especially prominent in responses from members of the DPR, while members of DPRD mentioned it less frequently, perhaps reflecting the fact that the drafting of regional regulations is still mainly driven by local executive government initiative. DPRD members often mentioned CSOs in the context of their role in influencing members to have funding allocations made to particular local government programs during deliberations of the APBD. Sometimes this occurred through the personal authority of DPRD members to influence expenditure through various arrangements usually referred to as "*dana aspirasi*". Members of parliament also said they worked together with outside organisations under their role in oversight of executive government, such as taking up issues brought to their attention by CSOs and raising them during formal consultation sessions between parliament and government representatives, or by directly lobbying government officials.

The variety of engagements highlighted the contextual nature of interactions between parliament and civil society – no single mode is the "correct" one, but is a product of the circumstances of each case. The engagements broadly covered three types: advocacy, problem solving on social issues, and support for parliamentary strengthening. As would be expected, the most common form of engagement was where CSOs lobbied parliament for advocacy purposes, approaching either individual parliamentarians or a parliamentary body such as a committee, attempting to influence parliamentary decisions by providing information, arguments and advice. The main issues around the quality of CSO advocacy raised by interviewees has been discussed above. Secondly, informants referred to cases where CSOs would ask parliament to intervene to help individuals or groups suffering from particular health, educational, economic or other problems, particularly in relation to problems with access to government services and the quality of services provided. Because the sample of informants was tilted towards MAMPU partner connections, the most common example raised was the work of Aisyiyah and its affiliated institutions on cases related to women's health and economic disadvantage. Aisyiyah's community-level engagement with parliament was sometimes also coupled with advocacy for the creation of local regulations. A third type of engagement cited was where external organisations provided direct assistance to parliament. Given the nature of MAMPU, this was mostly related to assistance to women candidates for election and women members of parliament. Organisations such as the Indonesian Women's Caucus (KPI), National Commission for Women (Komnas Perempuan) and the Indonesian Women's Political Caucus (KPPI) provided training, advice and information-sharing for women participants in the political process.

Interviews often touched on the various channels and intermediaries through which external organisations might make contact with a member of parliament. The most obvious one was through the staff working for parliamentarians – the "expert staff" working for individual members, committees and party caucuses were cited as being very important for facilitating access to parliament. Other intermediaries included those connected to religious, alumni and professional networks in which the member of parliament was active.

Once again, Aisyayah was cited a number of times, particularly with its capacity to mobilise Muhammadiyah's influence with certain political parties and their members. In other cases, well-connected individuals such as journalists might play a role in connecting CSOs to the most relevant members of parliament, either on an informal basis or as a facilitator contracted by an organisation.

### 3.3. Relating to constituents is a challenge for parliamentarians

The problem of constituent relations was frequently mentioned by informants. Many find it difficult to engage productively with constituents because they can be flooded with "proposals" which are actually just requests for money, either from individuals or business interests seeking special concessions. They are also approached for assistance on personal and family problems related to health and education and access to government services. One informant observed that "macro policy issues are elite issues". A recurring theme was that constituents' expectations of their representatives are too high, when their capacity to provide solutions to individual problems was limited. Most constituents do not understand that the role of parliament is not to deliver services. The most prominent example informants referred to was BPJS, where increasing numbers of constituents are approaching parliament because of administrative problems in registering or receiving entitlements.

Some informants mentioned ways that they tried to deal with constituents. These included having one day a week set aside for constituents to raise issues directly with them in the parliamentarian's office, a system that the informant attempted to encourage amongst party colleagues. Many informants stressed the importance of trying to direct constituents to the most appropriate government agency who, unlike a member of parliament, does have the authority to deliver services. One mentioned that having a *rumah aspirasi* in their *dapil* was a useful way to monitor local socio-political dynamics, as well as a place for constituents to get information.

A number of interviews were held with parliamentarians working with participatory recesses (*reses partisipatif*). They contrasted the conventional approach to meeting constituents in formally structured and hierarchical meetings in parliamentary recess periods with the new *reses partisipatif* method which encourages two-way discussion between constituents and their representatives. Rather than formulaic speeches by a few local notables, the participatory approach was said to encourage a greater community voice and a way for problems to be discussed in small groups before being presented to the larger meeting. Emphasis was given to the fact that participants were not given payment for attendance, but were only provided with lunch or snacks.

### 3.4. Committees are the most productive openings for CSO engagements

Interview discussions ranged over the various entry points through which external influence can be exercised in parliament, and it was often stressed that CSOs should exploit potential openings wherever and whenever they appeared. But a clear general conclusion was that of all possible ways to engage with parliament, targeting committee proceedings had the greatest potential to produce results. In particular, a clear contrast was drawn between the respective roles of committees and *fraksi* as decision-making organs. While, on occasion, *fraksi* will transmit specific policy instructions from party leaders, one interviewee summed up the common view that parties "only indicate the general direction of policy and tactical decisions are up to DPR members to improvise". Other informants observed that policy decisions were not made in *fraksi* meetings, but by



the small number of parliamentarians active in any particular committee and/or in meetings of the *poksi* (*kelompok fraksi* – the members of a party within a committee). The work of *fraksi* was focused on administrative procedures, although this included the power to move members around from their positions in committees. Interviews with DPRD members made it particularly clear that party allegiances meant very little at all in sub-national politics, particularly in relation to policy stances. One informant declared that the party and *fraksi* “did not ever” give instructions to DPRD members on what they should argue in policy discussions.

### 3.5. Mixed opinions about issues related to women in politics

When the question of specific challenges and tasks faced by women as candidates and members of parliament was raised, there was a mix of responses. There was universal support for the 30 percent quota for women candidates, but also a general opinion that it is difficult for the parties to find sufficient women to meet the quota. This was usually explained in terms of the financial and family challenges for women wanting to enter politics, although one informant suggested that the quota made it easier for women than men to stand for election. There was some discussion about the difficulty women have in matching the resources of men in the game of “money politics”. At the same time, some women informants pointed out that many women politicians came from wealthy backgrounds, or were related to powerful males.

Regarding the challenges for women once they are in parliament, it was frequently highlighted that some women are reluctant to speak publicly, including inside parliament, with constituents and with the media. The need for CSO support for media training for women was raised by a number of informants, with one suggesting that there were many women activists inside parties and that they should be targeted for capacity-building. Questions about negative attitudes from male parliamentarians brought contrasting responses from women informants – one said that her male colleagues “limited their voices”, while another declared that she “didn’t find any obstruction” and that the issue was whether each woman had the ability required for her job. Some interviewees focused on the lack of gender sensitive understanding amongst executive officials rather than particular problems for women legislators. Ideas about how female parliamentarians might differ from males included that women MPs would invite more women to public events, schedule meetings at times more suitable for those with family commitments, and that women members of parliament were more personal in their approach to politics and were more focused on details. One notable undercurrent of responses amongst the women interviewees was that they did not necessarily see their gender identity as the dominant factor in their politics. One female informant pointed out that “I don’t present myself as a woman MP – my role is to be a speaker for my constituents”. Another emphasised her background in labour organisations and civil society.

### 3.6. Women’s caucus is not prominent

It was notable that few, if any, women respondents gave the impression that the parliamentary women’s caucus (KPPRI) was prominent in their activities. One interviewee, who was a leading figure in KPPRI, mentioned the work of the caucus in attempting to influence the drafting of certain that had special implications for women, but even she suggested that few women parliamentarians were active in it. She said 17 percent of DPRD women members were KPPRI members, with 5 percent being active in the body. She explained that the women had “too many other things to do”. One informant mentioned that she was involved in monthly caucus meetings bringing together women

parliamentarians from a number of districts in her province, but said that the meetings were largely for social purposes in the form of an *arisan* gathering. A number of interviewees said that they were more engaged with other women's political organisations such as Kaukus Perempuan Politik Indonesia (KPPI), Maju Perempuan Indonesia (MPI), Koalisi Perempuan Indonesia (KPI), or their party's women's organisation.

## 4. Political and contextual: MAMPU's modes of parliamentary engagement

The evolution of MAMPU's parliamentary engagement has shown that engagement will take many different forms and that those forms will respond to context. The context will vary in different ways: according to the issue involved and its political ramifications; the timing of developments; the relevant institutions and actors; which of MAMPU's objectives are involved; and the strengths and capacity of the particular MAMPU partner. And the context is a critical element of success – what works in one time and place may be more difficult in another. The following section highlights the various modes of parliamentary engagement that MAMPU partners have found most effective and compatible with their way of working.

### 4.1. Empowerment of women parliamentarians

The first mode of MAMPU parliamentary engagement has been working with women parliamentarians to strengthen their role in politics. BAKTI has been the main partner in this work because it was assigned to lead Component Two when parliamentary engagement was conceived as a separate set of activities. From the beginning of BAKTI's MAMPU work in 2012, its planned activities therefore focused on enhancing the capacity of female (and gender-advocate male) sub-national parliamentarians to perform their legislative, budgeting and oversight roles, developing political skills such as public speaking, media relations, leadership and understanding of pro-gender and pro-poor perspectives in policy and planning. BAKTI conducted preliminary research and assessment work from 2012 and began implementing pilot activities in three provinces from 2014. From mid-2014 to mid-2015 it conducted a large baseline study on the capacity of women parliamentarians in eastern Indonesia (BAKTI 2015), which informed much of its subsequent program of activities designed to increase parliamentary capacity and to facilitate greater interaction between DPRDs, constituents and local government, especially on issues related to poor women's access to services.

As BAKTI's experience with parliamentary engagement has deepened its approach has changed. In accordance with MAMPU strategy, BAKTI initially endeavoured to support the formation of women's parliamentary caucuses and their involvement in advocacy for gender-based *perda* and budgeting. In practice, however, caucuses did not prove effective as the primary means for connecting with women parliamentarians or promoting MAMPU's pro-gender themes. In BAKTI's view, as conveyed to the author of this report, the caucuses did not function well in general terms and, more pertinently, did not prove capable of promoting perspectives on gender, human rights and social issues. In practice, the most effective method for cooperating with local parliaments that BAKTI has developed has been through constituent groups (*kelompok konstituen*) and participative recesses (*reses partisipatif*). *Kelompok konstituen* are groups of women formed by non-government organisations to raise awareness about issues related to gender and women's access to government services, based on the electoral district (*dapil*) of their DPRD. Their objective is to bring individual cases and general problems to the attention of the local parliament and executive agencies. *Reses partisipatif* are a method used by the groups to foster dialogue between female constituents and their local parliamentarians.

These innovative initiatives will be discussed in more detail in section 5.5., but the key point to note here is that BAKTI's methodology has evolved. Apart from moving on from

the initial focus on women's caucuses, BAKTI has supplemented its mentoring and technical assistance to women parliamentarians with a methodology concentrating on case-centred problem-solving interactions between parliaments and constituents. This accords closely with one of the fundamentals of MAMPU's approach – supporting networks and multi-stakeholder processes. It simultaneously strengthens constituent relations systems in parliament, develops the experience of female parliamentarians in working with constituents, while also providing openings for issues of concern to MAMPU partners to be dealt with by parliamentarians.

## 4.2. Engagement on national legislation

While the larger part of MAMPU's parliamentary engagement has taken place in the provinces and districts, there have been important interventions in the national legislation deliberated by the DPR. A pattern has emerged where MAMPU partner activities at the national level have concentrated on policy issues that provide a framework within which partners and other stakeholders at the regional level can operate. For example, the passage of the law on migrant workers had positive benefits for workers recruited through regional level processes. Similarly, a law on sexual violence has the potential to have a major impact on the provision of services to victims in local areas and how non-government organisations can assist them. Not surprisingly, MAMPU partners with a more nation-wide identity, such as Komnas Perempuan, KPI and Migrant Care, have taken the lead in this field.

Migrant Care is the most prominent example of this mode of MAMPU partner work, and the one where success has been the most clearly identifiable. Following the inauguration of a new DPR in October 2014 elections, Migrant Care began lobbying with a consortium of two other migrant labour organisations for amendments to the law on Indonesian overseas workers. Migrant Care worked with specialist staff (*tenaga ahli*) on a draft law and convened meetings between the staff, interested members of *fraksi* and the DPR Legislation Committee (*Baleg*). The three MAMPU partners were able to develop a good relationship with the chair of the committee responsible for the bill and with the Minister for Manpower, both of whom were supportive of legislative reform.

Migrant Care has emphasised that their interaction with parliament on the bill took many forms, with formal activities such as *audiensi*, appearances before DPR committees, public events and media conferences, as well as informal approaches such as meetings with individual DPR members in cafes, members' homes and in the offices of Migrant Care. Migrant Care's input was appreciated by leading DPR members because it provided extensive data about the issue, as well as offering practical proposals for key problems as they appeared, such as suggested wording for individual clauses of the bill. The three organisations were closely associated with every stage of the drafting and deliberations on the legislation and their efforts were rewarded with the passage of a law that incorporated most of the proposals they had put forward to the DPR.

It should also be emphasised that MAMPU has encouraged Migrant Care to extend this work to the sub-national level, with the aim of influencing the passage of *perda* on migrant labour in a number of regions. For example in early 2015 the organisation worked with a multi-stakeholder network in NTT and NTB to develop draft *perda* on migrant workers and their families in three districts in the provinces. By the middle of the year the drafts had been accepted by two of the three relevant local legislatures as DPRD initiatives. One

*perda* had been passed into law by the end of the year, and another DPRD had completed passage of the regulation by early 2016.

These activities are clear examples of engaging with parliament as a channel of influence. Migrant Care used a multiplicity of formal and informal entry points and identified “champions” within the parliament and executive. The political context of this work was also critical to its success: the plight of migrant workers had generated a great deal of public sympathy and legislative changes took place in an environment where the government was supportive of reform and the minister was particularly committed. A similar situation applied at the regional level, especially in provinces such as NTT and NTB, which are migrant-sending areas. As an organisation with a specialised focus and with access to highly relevant data and cases studies, Migrant Care’s approach produced good results.

Another important target for national legislative change, but in a very different political context, has been the legislation on sexual violence (RUU PKS) currently under discussion in the DPR. The lead has been taken by MAMPU partners Komnas Perempuan and Forum Pengada Layanan (FPL). The MAMPU partners have pursued a raft of different approaches to influence the content of the bill and to encourage parliamentarians to push ahead with its completion. This has included the development of a data-base by FPL on cases of violence against women. In general terms providing good-quality information is a form of outside support that is highly valued by parliamentarians, as noted in section 3.1. In this case it is particularly important because there is widespread ignorance – or even denial – in the community and the political class about extent of the problem of sexual violence. The great contextual challenge is that the social and political climate is not favourable to the passage of the bill because of powerful opposition from conservative religious organisations who have attacked the bill as incompatible with Islamic family and moral values, and whose arguments are finding resonance in parliament and executive government. This is in stark contrast to the political atmosphere in favour of legislative protection for migrants workers, mentioned above, that created a favourable context for MAMPU’s work. In response to these difficulties, Komnas Perempuan is developing a new strategy to draw in a wider range of new actors into the effort, a move which is a good example of adjusting approaches in response to changing context.

#### **4.3. Regional engagement: Case-work, regulations and APBD**

A great deal of MAMPU partners’ parliamentary engagement has grown out of case-work in the thematic areas at the provincial and district level. As partners work with community organisations in their target localities on individual cases related to poor women’s access to services they have developed interventions to deal with issues systemically. This usually involves working in a multi-stakeholder approach with local government, media and CSOs – and the local DPRD. In this mode of engagement, parliamentarians are a channel for voice and influence to deal with grass-roots problems.

As an example, Aisyiyah’s parliamentary engagement did not emerge out of a pre-determined model or strategy but has developed in the context of specific needs at the provincial and district level. In one instance in Damak in Central Java, Aisyiyah identified weaknesses in local government health services for women, specifically on screening for cervical cancer. Their approach was to work with a supportive female DPRD member who was a member of the DPRD *komisi* on health. The *komisi* pressured the local government



to provide increased funding for screening, including for training of medical staff. Incidentally, the DPRD member was the one mentioned in section 2.2. as having become close to Aisyayah as a result of the parliamentary conference. On the same issue in Bantaeng in South Sulawesi, Aisyiyah obtained support for their program of training for medical staff through the intervention of a supportive female DPRD member who mobilised funding through what is generally referred to as *dana aspirasi*.<sup>1</sup> As well as targeting DPRD members to influence allocations in the APBD, Aisyiyah has worked with parliamentarians on the drafting of local regulations. For example, in Bantaeng has influenced the drafting of both the *naskah akademis* and the text of a regulation on social protection. In Cianjur district in West Java Aisyiyah lobbied for the drafting of a regulation on health by connecting with a DPRD member with longstanding connections with Aisyiyah.

Aisyayah has achieved outcomes with its mode of parliamentary engagement because of particular aspects of the context in which it operates as an organisation. Firstly, Aisyayah's affiliation with Muhammadiyah has facilitated many of its DPRD connections because of the networks of parliamentarians who are also active in Muhammadiyah and either already know the Aisyayah figures or are very familiar with its work and its outlook. For Aisyiyah this approach provides access to parliament that might take some other organisations longer to build while, on the other hand, some organisations might find it restricted their circles of influence too much. Secondly, Aisyayah has learnt to calibrate its approaches according to results – sometimes it has achieved outcomes by working with local government agencies, while in other cases it has proved more effective to operate through connections in the DPRD. In their case, this particularly relates to their role as a service-delivery organisation involved in activities such as the training for health workers. If they obtain funding for activities they are supporting it is not crucial, in itself, to achieve this through a parliamentary rather than an executive channel of influence. It is notable that Aisyiyah is now planning to hold more multi-stakeholder meetings bringing together executive agencies, DPRD members and community organisations.

The MAMPU partner BITRA has had a high level of parliamentary engagement at the sub-national level. For example, it successfully lobbied on district-level regulations on protection of home-workers by working closely with a selected number of members of the relevant *komisi*. As in the case of Aisyiyah, they were motivated to push for regulatory change based on the knowledge of individual cases of the problems confronting home-workers. But being more of an advocacy than a service-delivery organisation it placed more emphasis on the mobilisation of community-based coalitions to lobby for the drafting and passage of regulations. Unlike the Aisyiyah approach of using contacts supplied by a large parent organisation, BITRA developed a two-pronged strategy of combining pressure from grass-roots mobilisation and direct personal interaction with parliamentarians through both formal and informal channels.

<sup>1</sup> Strictly speaking this was not *dana aspirasi* as it is usually understood. The common perception is of a certain amount of funds that DPRD members can expend at their discretion, but in this case it is a process through which DPRD members can influence that allocation of a certain of spending in the APBD.



## 5. The way forward

This report so far has outlined the evolution of MAMPU's approach, highlighted the principle concerns raised by parliamentarians in the interviews and emphasised that MAMPU partners have developed various different modes of parliamentary engagement responding to different contexts and challenges. The following section sets out a range of conclusions about the lessons learnt from MAMPU's parliamentary engagement and proposes recommendations about how the project can proceed during the remainder of its operation.

### 5.1. Sharing and sustaining parliamentary engagement across MAMPU

As MAMPU approaches its final phase, it is time to both increase the general level of parliamentary engagement and to provide opportunities for the more experienced partners to pass on some of their approaches and methods. Indeed this was advocated in the most recent MAMPU progress report with the observation that "there is an increasingly urgent need to share promising practices across partners and themes" (Progress Report May 2018: 22). It has already begun in the case of BAKTI and *reses partisipatif* and this should be extended more broadly. The level and intensity of parliamentary engagement has varied across the different MAMPU partners and sub-partners. Some have become very familiar with parliamentary procedure and developed considerable skill in the arts of exercising voice and influence with parliamentarians, while others have had less exposure to parliament. And even if some partners have less experience than others, many have a story to tell about their parliamentary engagement which should be shared across MAMPU. Extending parliamentary engagement more widely across partners and sub-partners will contribute to the sustainability of MAMPU parliamentary approaches and networks post-MAMPU, including if further DFAT funding is made available.

#### Convene a second parliamentary conference

MAMPU is therefore approaching a time when it would be appropriate to convene a second parliamentary conference. The original plan had been to follow up the first conference with annual events, but this was apparently not possible. The first conference produced a range of benefits for MAMPU partners at an early stage of the project, including strengthening networks amongst supportive parliamentarians, and this could be replicated in a second conference now that partners have accumulated a wealth of experience and expertise. Up until now it appears that there has only been limited opportunities for cross-partner sharing of knowledge and approaches, and this is possibly the last opportunity to gather the partners into one place to discuss lessons learnt and ways forward. MAMPU partners repeatedly mention the acute problem of turnover of partners and champions in the parliamentary environment, even within the life of one parliament. After an election, of course, the turnover is huge. The conference would therefore help establish new parliamentary relationships for MAMPU partners as they continue their activities beyond MAMPU. MAMPU needs to ensure that the channels of influence in parliament that have been established during the project's implementation can be replenished after the election and will be sustainable into the future.

This is not to suggest that there are blue-prints or models that can be mechanically applied from one partner to another. Section 4 on modes of partner parliamentary engagement particularly emphasised the importance of context. Care must be taken to ensure that lessons learnt are passed on in such a way that particular circumstances of each success

or failure is highlighted – it is easy to learn the wrong lessons from history. But every new partner engagement need not start from zero because MAMPU as a whole has amassed an abundance of experience of working with the DPR and DPRD, in the context of building multi-stakeholder coalitions involving the executive and legislative branches of government, civil society and the community.

## 5.2. Thinking politically: Work within the incentives that face parliamentarians

The first qualitative approach that needs to be disseminated across all MAMPU partners is the critical role of thinking politically when engaging with parliamentarians. The report on the political economy of parliament analysed the incentives that members of parliament must respond to in order to be elected and re-elected. The report described the range of pressures that are forcing parliamentarians to participate in a political contest where those who can mobilise the greatest financial resources are the most likely to succeed. Such conclusions could be read as being overwhelming pessimistic and as inevitably pushing all politicians to respond to the forces of “money politics”, to the exclusion of good policy, quality legislation and the enforcement of accountability over the executive. But the report emphasised that politicians also have agency – they operate within a structure of incentives but they make choices about how they respond. And, moreover, the behaviour of parliamentarians can vary greatly according to the issue involved and its timing within the political and electoral cycle. They will not always be consistent in their responsiveness to approaches from outside.

Such an understanding is important when identifying entry points with parliament and who are likely to be partners or “champions”. Rather than expecting that there will necessarily be a clearly recognisable bloc of dependable “reformers”, it is more productive to map out who may be willing to cooperate on an opportunistic basis on a particular issue at a specific time. It can be useful to think in terms of three likely cohorts amongst the decision-makers on any issue: the obvious advocates, the clear opponents and the – probably largest – grouping of “undecideds” that can be swayed by developments. Parliaments will usually have a cohort of the first kind who are known to be consistently motivated by policy concerns or a thought-out political philosophy/ideology, but they will regrettably be small in number and should not be the exclusive focus of attention. The second cohort of committed opponents would clearly not be productive targets.

The third non-committal cohort, on the other hand, will usually include individuals who can be brought on side because of particular interests related to the issue at hand. They may appear to be figures whose political activities are mainly motivated by immediate personal or family gain, but for reasons related to a special combination of circumstances, they may be willing to cooperate. They may be attracted to working with a MAMPU partner because the issue affects their *dapil*, or concerns a sector where their allies have an interest, or has implications for internal dynamics within their party, *fraksi* or *komisi* – or any number of possibilities. “Reformers” can emerge from the most surprising places. But tomorrow, on another issue, they may not return calls.

Of course, all potential relationships or alliances with parliamentary cohorts need to undergo a careful risk assessment. There may be political risks inherent in working with a particular individual or group of parliamentarians who have a wider political or ideological agenda, and/or there may be reputational risks of being seen associating with

someone who is later revealed to have been involved in unethical or illegal behaviour. Political relationships are based on mutual advantage, but while identifying potential benefits in a particular partnership, it is also important to identify the risks of being exploited or of the unintended consequences of being associated with negative views or practices.

When a MAMPU partner has mapped out the character of the three cohorts and has identified some key individuals who might fit into them, the first target for contact should be the most prominent figures in the first, supportive, cohort. Building ongoing working relationships with these individuals should be a major priority, and hopefully links can be forged with others in their respective parliamentary bodies and *fraksi*/parties. Over time it might also be possible to identify allies in the second cohort, although the first task for this grouping is usually to develop the most powerful and influential arguments and data that might sway them into moving towards a supportive position. Clearly, the third cohort is unlikely to be a source of support, so it is tactically savvy to listen to the arguments coming from this side and think in terms of developing responses and rebuttals that can be of help to supportive individuals and shift vacillating opinion in the second cohort.

**Figure 1: Working with Parliamentary Cohorts**

Cohort One Potential allies and champions	Cohort Two "Undecideds" who may swing either way	Cohort Three Strong opponents
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• First priority targets for contact.</li> <li>• Identify those with most appropriate expertise &amp; record.</li> <li>• Make personal contact to enlist their cooperation &amp; support.</li> <li>• Provide them with information &amp; arguments.</li> <li>• Build ongoing personal relationships in both formal and informal settings.</li> <li>• Be responsive to their needs as your issue develops.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Second priority targets.</li> <li>• Be sure they are exposed to your public advocacy materials &amp; information.</li> <li>• Closely monitor their involvement in your issue in case they show signs of moving either way in the debate.</li> <li>• Monitor any changes in their actions and/or public statements, and adjust your tactics in response.</li> <li>• Make personal contact if it seems appropriate. If responsive, start to build ongoing connection.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitor their statements &amp; arguments and prepare counter-arguments.</li> <li>• Be sure they are exposed to your public advocacy materials &amp; information.</li> <li>• Monitor any changes in their actions and/or public statements, and adjust your tactics in response.</li> </ul>

It is important to note that the number of close working partners is likely to eventually centre on a core group of individuals, after an initial period of surveying all possible openings. The targets for general publicity and argumentation will be wide, but allies and "champions" will be few. This accords with MAMPU's own experience, as described in a 2016 progress report about maturing relationships with key actors:

Early on, as relationships were being established, many partners were introducing their work to district governments and village heads for the first time. This often involved frequent meetings, presentations, and audiences with large numbers of officials from multiple government agencies. Key individuals or potential champions were often not known at this early stage and contact tended to be with a wide range of individuals. However, as relationships have been established, partners have narrowed the circle of contacts to fewer strategically placed officials and committed parliamentarians. (Progress Report Nov 2016: 6)

The process has been repeatedly observed in international development practice in the governance field, including the author's own. As an example, a US-funded local governance program in Indonesia concluded from its work to bring about change through regional parliaments that:

Often just a few key reform-minded individuals in each council [DPRD] were able to promote change. Where these individuals had the authority to take a position of leadership, the chances of success increased significantly (LGSP 2009: 5-28).

The key lessons are that trust and engagement takes time and requires politically-informed stakeholder analysis to connect with the right partners, and that strategic interventions in concert with leading decision-makers will pay dividends.

It is imperative that MAMPU partners bring something politically valuable to potential partners in parliament. They should also consider the how and when – the timing and style of the approach. Thinking politically means knowing what is appropriate and what is timely. Parliamentary informants for this study emphasised that their most productive interactions with outside organisations came when they were approached in a spirit of constructive engagement and were given “something we can work with”. This might include alternative wording for clauses of bills, key policy documents and *naskah akademik*, data and case studies, or strategic perspectives and arguments to use against opponents. Attempts to influence parliamentarians' through hectoring, aggressive approaches rarely work. If a politician perceives that a CSO is interested only in getting public attention and building the organisation's own profile he/she will quickly withdraw. This is not to deny, however, that a well-timed demonstration might be tactically useful, whether to keep wavering supporters on track or to give allies some outside support.

In summary, understanding that electoral and parliamentary politics in Indonesia are deeply flawed does not mean that there are no openings for engagement. Indeed, the experience of MAMPU partners at both national and regional levels shows that this is not the case. But realising that political relationships are inherently opportunistic and often impermanent does provide a foundation for clear-headed thinking about what is politically possible at any given time or, as Bismarck famously quipped: “politics is the art of the possible, the attainable”. Even the most unlikely candidates may turn out to have interests that coincide with ours from time to time and good outcomes may result. Of course, it is sensible to aim for lasting long-term alliances when more principled agreement with a committed champion is possible, but this cannot be expected in all cases.



### 5.3. Two sides of one coin: empowering women parliamentarians and channels of influence

Section 3 on the evolution of MAMPU's parliamentary engagement showed that the early conception of parliamentary work as a separate component began to change fairly soon after implementation began. Eventually the idea of a separate set of parliamentary activities with separate indicators was dropped in practice. This was replaced by the view that parliamentary engagement was a channel of influence through which MAMPU partners could achieve wider objectives defined by the five themes. This evolution appears to have taken place organically, rather than through a central MAMPU decision, as MAMPU partners began to work with national and local parliamentarians to influence the passage of laws, regulations and budget allocations.

For MAMPU, empowering women parliamentarians and developing parliamentary channels of influence should be viewed as two sides of the one coin. All partners are likely to become engaged with national or local parliaments at some time or other during interventions in their respective thematic areas. This will vary according to each partner, as well as varying in intensity over time as issues come and go. In the process, MAMPU partners will not only advance the objectives of women's access to services, but they will contribute to tangible parliamentary outcomes such as the passage of pro-gender laws, regulations and budgets, as well as political benefits to their parliamentary partners, especially women parliamentarians. Women and pro-gender male parliamentarians are both targets for support and a means to assist the achievement of MAMPU goals. Both can be accomplished simultaneously.

For example, advocacy for provincial and district regulations conducted by MAMPU partners and sub-partners is integral to the achievement of objectives related to better services for poor women in their respective regions. The lobbying of various DPRD by Aisyiyah to improve women's reproductive health services in a number of localities, discussed in 4.4., was one element of a wider strategy focusing on individual parliamentarians, DPRD regulation-making and local government agencies. Advocacy on national legislation such on migrant workers and sexual violence can achieve policy reforms while also contributing to, and benefiting from, the empowerment of gender-sensitive parliamentarians. The clearest example of the mutually-reinforcing outcomes of interaction between parliament and MAMPU partners and local CSOs is the *reses partisipatif* methodology. By creating sustainable channels of influence through which the concerns of poor women in communities can be discussed with parliamentarians, these groups both empower communities and increase the standing and respect in which the parliamentarians are held in those communities.

### 5.4. Work with women's caucuses only where appropriate

The experience of MAMPU since its earliest days of operation clearly leads to the conclusion that women's caucuses cannot be seen as primary channels of influence, although they may be valuable in individual cases. The potential for achieving MAMPU objectives through caucuses should be subjected to the same critical examination as any other potential engagement.

The initial conception of the role of women's caucuses in MAMPU was based on the idea that caucuses such as KPPRI and KPPI were, by definition, the most appropriate focus for

engagement with female parliamentarians and gender issues. Support for “capacity improvements to the women’s caucuses” was seen as one of the three “long-term objectives” of MAMPU (Design doc pt 1: 21) which would “help them become anchors for the coalitions” to be built by MAMPU partners (design doc: 24). The two rationales used to justify this was that, firstly, women’s caucuses enabled a foreign-donor program “to be non-partisan when working in Indonesian politics” and, secondly, that caucuses were “by their very nature, ideal spaces for identifying and supporting women leaders” (Design Framework Component 2, 2013: 2).

The problem with the first rationale was that parliaments and political parties are inherently partisan and donor programs need to manage that reality rather than attempting to avoid it through indirect engagement with “non-partisan” bodies. In fact, there are well-established methodologies for working with partisan political bodies in an impartial way, as employed by institutes such as the US National Democratic Institute (NDI) and International Republican Institute (IRI), Australia’s Centre for Democratic Institutions (CDI) and the foundations affiliated with each of Germany’s political parties.

The second rationale is not sustained by the reality of the role that women’s caucuses actually play for women parliamentarians. International literature on women’s political empowerment highlights the importance of context – special measures such as caucuses have been effective *after* and *as a result of* wider economic and political empowerment of women in society, rather than being *the cause of* empowerment. The idea that such strategies are a “fast track” to women’s empowerment is increasingly contested (Hasim 2009). In Nordic countries, for example, the women’s parliamentary caucus has been influential, but here broader societal battles for women’s equality had already been fought and won – the measures *consolidated* progress but did not *initiate* it. (Dahlerup & Freidenvall 2005: 27). In the Indonesian context, a 2014 study of the Indonesian and East Timor parliamentary women’s caucuses found that they were quite marginal to their members concerns compared with the attention that they gave to party affairs and to following the party line (Soetjipto 2014). There is an inherent problem in attempting to empower women through a body that is largely peripheral to decision-making processes (Soetjipto 2014: 42-43). As mentioned in section 3.6., both KPPRI and KPPI are a low priority for most women parliamentarians, whose activities are focused on their *fraksi*, *komisi* and constituent activities because these are the arenas where the incentives are strongest and where tangible political rewards are to be won.

Given this background, it was not surprising that MAMPU quickly encountered obstacles when attempting to implement the planned work with caucuses in practice. A 2014 MAMPU progress report mentioned the difficulties of operationalising the bodies, “thus limiting MAMPU’s ability to engage commissions or members of parliament on their policy agendas” (Progress Report Nov 2014: 3). In the same year MAMPU commissioned a broad survey of regional women’s caucuses which presented a very discouraging picture of the state of the caucuses. The survey report listed deficiencies related to: low numbers of members and active participants; weak decision-making processes and work-planning; lack of financial sustainability; low knowledge of the policy process; and lack of cohesion stemming from the multiplicity of the political and social backgrounds of the women (Strategic Asia 2014: 36-40). The report mentioned that caucuses did not actually exist in many regions or were below “critical mass” because of the small number of women members in numerous DPRD. The extremity of the problem with regional weaknesses was



of particular concern to MAMPU, given its focus on working at the sub-national level. BAKTI reported on the problems with the caucuses, adding that both KPPRI and KPP were “not strong enough to encourage the strengthening of the capacity of women members of parliament” and recommending that work with local NGOs was more effective for advancing MAMPU objectives.

In practice, whatever the original project design, MAMPU has moved on from the idea of making women’s caucuses the primary entry point and instrument for MAMPU’s parliamentary engagement. This was despite the fact that two reports commissioned by MAMPU were uncritical in their analysis of women’s caucuses and recommended that they be a key MAMPU focus (Kemitraan 2014 & Situational Analysis Component 2 2013). This approach has effectively been endorsed by the realities of implementation and by the successful modes of parliamentary engagement described in Section 4, none of which worked through caucuses. The use of a variety of entry points and modes of engagement on a case-by-case and contextual basis has proven effective and should continue.

None of this should, however, be interpreted as suggesting that women’s caucuses should be avoided on principle. It may be that, on some issue at a certain time and place, the local women’s parliamentary caucus could be a productive partner. In particular, the leaders of caucuses should always be kept in mind as possible contacts to help identify supportive women or to provide introductions to key players in more instrumental parliamentary bodies such as committees or *fraksi*. But neither should caucuses be regarded as necessarily “ideal spaces” for MAMPU parliamentary engagement. All possible parliamentary entry points should be analysed politically and mapped out to identify opportunities that might arise in any particular set of circumstances.

### 5.5. Extend the replication of *reses partisipatif*

We have seen in Section 4.1. that one of elements in the evolution of BAKTI’s parliamentary engagement has been the development of *kelompok konstituen (KK)* and *reses partisipatif (RP)*. These two inter-related methodologies for parliamentary engagement are truly innovative and potentially ground-breaking. The replication of these approaches with other MAMPU partners should be maintained, but with always with careful consideration for context – what might work in certain circumstances may not work everywhere.

BAKTI’s approach grew out of a pragmatic endeavour to deal with a grassroots challenge – how to facilitate two-way communications between DPRD members and poor women wanting better access to services. BAKTI observed the operation of the conventional approach to meetings between DPRD members and their constituents during the parliamentary recess and realised that something better needed to be done. But apart from being an innovative effort to advance the objectives of MAMPU, this approach is also a response to a deep flaw in political governance in Indonesia. While Indonesia has made huge progress in the development of representative legislative institutions since 1998, the country’s parliaments are still bedevilled by the lack of consistent and systematic communication between parliamentarians and their constituents.

Democratic parliaments should, firstly, be representative in the sense that they are composed of representatives sent from across a country. But, secondly, there should be processes to ensure that putative representatives can articulate the interests of their

constituents and that these processes are underpinned by a culture of communication with the people. Internationally, a great deal has been written on this subject by scholars of politics and legislatures and by international development agencies. The scholarly literature has focused on the normative and theoretical aspects of constituency relations as a principle at the very heart of the ideal of democracy. Other work has empirically and comparatively studied the various ways in which relations with constituents are practiced by parliamentarians across the world (see for example Jewell 1983 and Norton & Wood 1993). Similarly, the international development perspective has stressed that the goals of fostering good parliamentarian-constituent relations are desirable in themselves as foundations for democracy, as well as being practical instruments for good policy and service-delivery outcomes (IPU 2006).

These fundamental issues have been frequently debated in post-*reformasi* Indonesia, including in academic, NGO, media, political party and official circles. But it has to be said that progress has been slow and marked by approaches that achieve more in appearance than substance. Official attempts to encourage members of parliament to visit their *dapil* have focused on regulation, compulsion and financial compensation. The rules of procedure for the DPR (*Tata Tertib*) describe in detail the “working visits” that DPR members are expected to carry out in their *dapil* during parliamentary recess periods, including their frequency, timing and reporting procedures (*Tata Tertib* DPR: pasal 210-14). The rules are not obligatory, but they are clearly designed to put moral pressure on parliamentarians. To provide an extra incentive, DPR members receive an allowance to compensate them for travelling expenses incurred by themselves and their staff. While it is normal practice internationally to provide travelling allowances, it is highly unusual to have regulations to push members into performing their duties as representatives. This could be seen as evidence that the *political*, as distinct from regulatory, incentives that normally encourage parliamentarians to carry out these roles are not working in Indonesia. One argument that was mounted in favour of the “open list” electoral system (discussed in the political economy analysis) was that it would force parliamentarians to become closer to their constituents in order to be re-elected. At the time of writing, there has not been any published research that has sustained this argument.

The weakness of such regulation-based approaches is that they create artificial, top-down pressures in an attempt to replace organic bottom-up incentives from constituents and the wider political culture. They could also be seen as attempts to use administrative mechanisms to replace the role that political parties are generally expected to play in aggregating and communicating popular concerns and aspirations, but which they are failing to do in Indonesia. The result has been that many of the interactions that occur between parliamentarians and constituents under these arrangements are formal, ritualistic and top-down. Activities are conducted for the sake of form, in order to fulfil regulatory obligations and to receive financial incentives, rather than to achieve substantive objectives. Informants for this study and other sources describe a typical recess activity as consisting of a public meeting addressed by one or more parliamentarians and representatives of local government (overwhelmingly male), with long set speeches and little, if any, opportunity for public input. Participants are paid an allowance to attend, thus encouraging a culture where people attend purely for the money and where invitations are given out as patronage by influential local figures. Topics covered tend to be dominated by physical infrastructure because this is an obvious way for parliamentarians to present themselves as bringing tangible benefits to the community.

Wider social and economic issues and problems with government services, including those of particular concern to women, are rarely discussed.

It was these realities that BAKTI observed and which motivated the development of *reses partisipatif*. There is a huge well of latent political pressure within the community that is dormant for lack of any organisational focus. The constituent groups initiated by BAKTI are way for that latent capacity to be organised and mobilised to put pressure on representatives. This is step forward from the traditional service NGO approach where outside organisations speak *for* their target group – the BAKTI method supports action *by* groups of citizens to speak for themselves. The *reses partisipatif* are a way of taking up the previously formalistic official recess proceedings and turning them into active participatory events. They are thus a pioneering effort to deal with a critically important issue in Indonesian political governance. The special contribution is that they are a bottom-up initiative where constituents set the agenda and discuss the issue they consider to be important. The role of MAMPU partners is to help aggregate community issues and present them in a systematic way to parliamentary representatives.

The initiative to spread this methodology by training other MAMPU partners to replicate the approach outside BAKTI's regions is to be commended and should be extended. There are, however, some points that should be highlighted. Most importantly, the attention that is given to *reses partisipatif* events in most descriptions of the methodology should not obscure the importance of their being based on some kind of constituent-based organisations.<sup>2</sup> In the BAKTI approach, *reses partisipatif* are effective because they are based on grass-roots connections in the community provided by the *kelompok konstituen*. They provide a more extensive social basis and result in their benefits being spread more widely in the community. *Kelompok konstituen* are more than just a series of events: they create an ongoing network with their own leadership (*pengurus*) and an organisational entry point into local government through their MOU with the local government, leading to their formal recognition through a *surat keputusan* issued by *kepala desa*. The *reses partisipatif* are activities, while the *kelompok konstituen* are networks and organisations.

In extending the BAKTI approach with other MAMPU partners, it is essential that some form of constituent-based organisation be established to ensure the sustainability of *reses partisipatif*. This does not have to replicate BAKTI's structure precisely, including the title of *kelompok konstituen*, but should be shaped by each local context. But, as a general observation, there is a danger that if *reses partisipatif* are replicated before the groundwork of establishing strong a constituent organisation is completed there would be a series of events sustained only by the impetus of the sponsoring NGO, rather than being owned by local constituents themselves. As mentioned above, the strength of this methodology is that it is driven from the bottom-up by constituents' own concerns.

A further issue relates to the idea that *reses partisipatif* should be made compulsory, with the Ministry of Home Affairs issuing instructions that it be included as part of the rules of procedure (*tata tertib*) of all DPRD's. BAKTI has put forward this proposal as an idea that Komnas Perempuan could advocate with the Ministry. While the goal of spreading *reses partisipatif* throughout Indonesia is clearly laudable, there is a danger that the bottom-up character of the methodology would be lost if it were introduced as an administrative requirement in the absence of community or political ownership. The process could

<sup>2</sup> The MAMPU pamphlet *Apa itu reses partisipatif?* does not mention the *kelompok konstituen*.

reproduce many of the weaknesses that are evident in the current official parliamentary recess events that have been discussed above. This kind of risk has been noted in relation to the replication by government of other MAMPU initiatives (Progress Report May 2018: 13).

All of this relates to the question of how *reses partisipatif* can be sustained and spread more widely post-MAMPU. In an ideal world, the most effective way for the approach to become entrenched in Indonesian political culture would be if were to be taken up by political parties and made mandatory for all their parliamentary members. This would produce the best results because it would be politically driven, rather than being pushed by regulation and/or dependent on the sustainability of CSOs. The huge obstacle, however, is that political party organisations in Indonesia do not have the level of institutionalisation to make this happen in practice. If the Ministry of Home Affairs issued administrative instruction to DPRDs that recess meetings must be conducted according to certain procedures modelled on the *reses partisipatif* methodology, the problems of a top-down approach mentioned above would certainly appear. But it might, at least, open an opportunity for local CSOs to encourage the formation of *kelompok konstituen* or similar groups to make sure there is real community involvement in the process. This should also include working with DPRD members to spread word about the process by example, demonstrating to their colleagues the political advantage of involvement in the activity. The final big challenge would then be to spread this constituent-driven recess process beyond the areas where MAMPU partners have been working.

## 5.6. Entry points for intervention

The experience of MAMPU partners in working with parliament shows that there are many different entry points where parliamentary processes and individual parliamentarians can be engaged. This study has emphasised several times that understanding context is a central element of thinking politically and that context is highly fluid. The effectiveness of entry points will vary according to issue, time and place. This does not mean, however, that all entry points are necessarily equal. This section therefore highlights the fact that some points in the various parliamentary processes (eg legislative drafting, budget deliberations etc) are consistently more likely to be productive than others.

Figures 2 and 3 below illustrate a simplified version of the legislative process for DPR and government bills, the key actors at each stage and the potential entry points for MAMPU partners during the whole process. Appendices 1 to 3 provide a detailed examination of the entry points for engagement with the parliamentary process for lawmaking, budget drafting and oversight of executive government, including the types of possible intervention at the various stages of the processes.



Figure 2: RUU/Raperda National/Local Government Initiative





Figure 3: RUU/Raperda DPR/D Initiative



The following section summarises some key points regarding parliamentary entry points to highlight from the chart above.

#### 5.6.1. Committees are consistently more important than party caucuses (*fraksi*)

The political economy analysis emphasised that a conspicuous feature of parliaments in Indonesia is that the committee system has effectively taken on the policy-making role that is generally expected to be played by parties. The parties have become so preoccupied

with the politics of patronage and transactionalism that, as organisations, they give very limited attention to formulation of policy positions. There are many individuals within parties who work seriously on policy matters, but party leaders and their organisations rarely intervene, except in cases where they have a direct material interest – eg laws on elections and political parties. Therefore the most likely entry point for influencing virtually any parliamentary decision – whether legislation, budget or oversight – is the committee system. The term “committee system” is meant to include all committees and sub-committees – *komisi*, special committees (*pansus*), other parliamentary organs (*alat kelengkapan*) such as the budget committee, and sub-committees of these committee such as working committees (*panja*).

But the *fraksi* should not be ignored as possible entry points. Their activities should always be monitored because their leaders exercise the important power of deciding which of their members will be part of any given committee, and for rotating members through successive *komisi*. But since they do not, exceptions apart, make decisions on policy, budgets and so on, they are less important as entry point than committees. On some occasions the *fraksi* group within a *komisi* (known as the *kelompok fraksi* or *poksi*) can be important because their leaders may intervene in substantive committee discussions to coordinate the position being advocated by their members.

#### 5.6.2. Refine committee targets systematically – from *komisi* to sub-committee to individuals

We have made the general point that committees are usually a more productive entry point than *fraksi*. But the entry points within committees need to be systematically targeted to identify actual individuals. Having identified the relevant *komisi* or *pansus* responsible for a particular matter, the next step is to monitor the formation of a *panja* that will make the main decisions to be then agreed upon by the committee plenary. The same applies to other sub-committees such as a *tim perumus* that may be formed later in the process. At all of these stages, there will only be a limited number of individuals within the total committee membership who will be consistently active. These individuals will probably be the ones who actually make the key decisions and they should be the primary targets. It should also be noted that the actions of the leadership of committees at all stages (eg *ketua komisi*, *ketua panja* etc) should be given special attention. The importance of identifying actual individuals recalls the point made in section 5.2. that, following an initial stage of canvassing all potential supporters, the number of key allies and champions will probably be small.

#### 5.6.3. Entry points can be both formal and informal

Many MAMPU partners have reported that their parliamentary engagement has occurred through both official processes and informal interactions. This point is worth highlighting and listed as a first principle of parliamentary engagement because it can be crucial to success. It is sometimes suggested that Indonesian political processes are dominated by informal decision-making and this may indeed be the case. But it is a universal truth of politics anywhere in the world that deals and understandings reached in private are least as important as official proceedings. MAMPU partners should make use of formal events such as public hearings (RDPU), public seminars and so on, as well approaching key players in a parliamentary process through non-official opportunities such as private meetings, social events etc. Both forms are mutually-reinforcing. For example, the opportunity for private meetings may be opened up if a CSO shows itself to be effective in



public events, while statements made by a supportive parliamentarian in an official meeting can be influenced by arguments gleaned from sustained informal interactions with a CSO. Backroom promises are much more worthwhile if they are followed up by public commitments. The importance of informal interaction cannot be separated from the point made above about the need to refine targets down to key individuals. Informal personal connections are usually the way to make individual parliamentarians receptive to outside arguments.

#### **5.6.4. DPR/DPRD initiative bills provide more entry points than government bills**

As discussed in the political economy study, draft legislation can originate from the government or from the parliament. Tables 2 and 3 in section 5.6. show that both types of bills provide a range of entry points, but a DPR/D initiative bill process is, in practice, more responsive to outside influence than bills drafted by government. This is because the drafting of both the *naskah akademik* and the bill in the parliament are conducted as a more public process, when compared to drafting by a ministry. A paradoxical effect of the comparative weakness of parliament in drafting and analytical capacity in comparison with government ministries (discussed in the political economy study) is that the parliament often seeks technical input from the outside. This can include outsourcing of the first draft of legislation to CSOs and academic institutions. The experience of Migrant Care in the revision of the law on migrant workers is an example – had the legislation been drafted by a ministry, it would have been much more difficult to influence the content of the bill because deliberations would have occurred within the closed-door confines of bureaucratic procedures. *Baleg* in the DPR and *B.....* in DPRD have proved themselves to be more accessible than most Directorates or *Biro Hukum* in ministries. MAMPU partners should therefore expect to have more influence over a DPR/D initiative bill, therefore during the pre-drafting conceptual stages of a bill it could be very rewarding to lobby the DPR/D to take up possible legislation as a parliamentary initiative. Having a bill placed on the *Prolegnas* or *Prolegda* as a DPR/D initiative bill can be an important first-round victory.

#### **5.7. Increase engagement with parliament's oversight role**

MAMPU partners have achieved important results by supporting the drafting of national legislation and regional regulations. They have also managed to influence spending by regional governments for women's services by lobbying DPRD members to push for budget allocations during APBD deliberations. Most significantly, MAMPU partners have worked on a large number of executive government policy instruments, such as *surat keputusan* (SK) by governors and district heads. Of the over 300 policy instruments targeted by MAMPU partners, the majority relate to executive government policy actions. Some of this work is still in progress and a large number have already been issued by various local government bodies. With the growing number of policy instruments now in existence, or in the pipeline, MAMPU partners are putting increasing effort into addressing how policy instrument are implemented (Progress Report May 2018:11).

This large body of MAMPU activity opens up an important opening for parliamentary engagement that should be exploited more intensively – making use of parliament's oversight functions. As well as targeting executive agencies and parliament's lawmaking bodies for the creation and implementation of policy instruments, there is also great scope to do this through parliament's authority to oversee the executive. MAMPU partners can

encourage champions in the DPR and DPRD to apply pressure on executive officials about policy instruments that are in process of drafting and those that have been issued, but where there are problems arising at the implementation stage. This can be done through formal channels such as the regular working meetings between *komisi* and their counterpart agency, or the establishment of special investigation committees, in addition to informal methods where parliamentarians directly approach officials such as *bupati*, *kepala dinas* or *kepala desa*.

As discussed in section 1.7. of the political economy study, the oversight function is very popular amongst DPR members because it is seen as a quick way to build a public profile. But it has been less employed by DPRD members, partly because their low level of understanding of how to conduct the process (BAKTI 2015: 120-21). It is also possible that many local politicians (especially elected for the first time) still lack political confidence and are rather more overawed by the authority of the local governor or *bupati*. There is therefore considerable scope for promoting this important legislative role in the regions where MAMPU is active.

Oversight is a continuing activity which provides opportunities for parliamentarians to raise any issue of concern with government agencies. The results may be less tangible than a *perda* or a budget item, but they should be seen as complementary to both. Using this mechanism can be a way to obtain information about the operation of programs that would might otherwise be unobtainable for community organisations. It is the next logical step for MAMPU partners after they have succeeded in influencing the passage of new regulations, new executive policy commitments, and budget allocations to particular programs. And it is also a way to sustain ongoing close working relations with allies and champions in the DPRD who supported the original regulatory or budget measures. Of course, it can be used to raise issues about any long-standing government policy, regardless of whether it has been linked to some previous initiative supported by MAMPU partners.

### 5.8. The context of the 2019 elections

It is very important for MAMPU to frame parliamentary engagement over the remaining life of the project in the context of the upcoming legislative and presidential elections. The elections will create certain challenges for MAMPU partners when engaging with parliament and parliamentarians, but it is also a time of opportunity. Generally speaking, parliamentarians will be increasingly focused on planning and implementing their parties' election campaign and will be especially concerned with securing their own personal re-election, commencing with efforts to secure a top level position on the party ticket. The challenge will be to convince parliamentarians that MAMPU activities are not a distraction from their goal of being re-elected but, on the contrary, can actually help them to secure their political future. But there will also be new opportunities after the election is over, especially with newly-elected women and gender-supportive male parliamentarians.

Therefore we can view the rest of MAMPU's parliamentary work as being focused on four distinct periods:

- The pre-election time from now until the beginning of 2019, when specific constraints and opportunities for engagement with parliamentarians will still exist.
- The campaign period from beginning of 2019 to May 2019, when parliamentarians will be utterly absorbed with their personal and party fortunes;

- The post-election period from after the finalisation of results in late April 2019 until the inauguration of new DPR and DPRD in October 2019, when openings for work with new parliamentarians could be quite productive;
- The new political cycle when the new parliaments begin to operate in earnest from November 2019, when a range of openings for engagement will become clear.

#### 5.8.1. Pre-election: National level

The first point to stress is that, at the national level, the challenges for pre-election parliamentary engagement are likely to be greater than in the provinces and districts. This is because the major component of national-level work by MAMPU partners has involved advocacy for the passage of national legislation such as the migrant worker and sexual violence bills. As the election approaches it will become more and more difficult to focus DPR members' attention on legislative work as they become preoccupied with the election. The incentive to put more time into legislation will diminish with each passing month, and it will be harder to make the case that the time invested in lawmaking will be politically profitable. MAMPU champions may lose interest for the time being.

This problem will be particularly acute with the law on sexual violence where the sensitive nature of the issues has already made some parliamentarians wary about involvement. If the election campaign becomes focused on issues of religious identity, as seems very likely, the chances of the bill being pushed aside will be high. Depending on the character of the post-election DPR and government, it may be possible to resurrect the draft law, but the pre-election prospects look increasingly bleak. And if the election proves to be socially divisive, with rancorous debate over religiously-defined attitudes towards issues of family and personal morality, a new government may not be willing to put the bill on the legislative agenda again. This is not to suggest that the relevant MAMPU partners should abandon this work, but a realistic assessment of constraints and risks in the upcoming period needs to be made, including possible reputational damage to partners.

#### 5.8.2. Pre-election: Regional level

At the provincial and district level parliamentarians will also begin to calculate that the incentives to spend time in *perda*-making rather than campaigning are diminishing as the election date draws closer. The task for MAMPU partners will therefore be to make the case to DPRD members that there are still political returns to be made from persisting with work on *perda*. This might not be so challenging as it is at the national level, because *perda* tend to relate to things such as government services and infrastructure, with local services being, of course, the most important concerns for MAMPU partners. Local-level partners are in a stronger position to argue that if parliamentarians are seen supporting the passage of *perda* that enhance community services, it will be advantageous for their popularity and respect amongst the voters.

In any case, the balance of MAMPU partner activities at the region level is less weighted towards legislative advocacy than it is at the national level. There is greater diversity in the modes of MAMPU parliamentary engagement in the regions and this leaves more avenues open for work with parliamentarians in the lead up to the election. For example, multi-stakeholder approaches to MAMPU issues that involve linking up DPRD members, government representatives, CSOs and the community can still continue in the pre-election period provided parliamentarians can be convinced that it helps their profile in the community and thus with voters. This is one of the reasons section 5.7. argues for a greater

emphasis on encouraging parliamentarians to activate their authority to oversee executive agencies and enforce accountability for the provision of services and expenditure of public money.

The replication of the *reses partisipatif* methodology seems to be exceptionally well-suited to the pre-election period. As remarked in section 5.5., these activities provide for a very good match of interests between the objectives of MAMPU partners, the needs of constituents in the community and the incentives facing parliamentarians. For local politicians looking for ways to boost their popularity without having to run the expensive race of money-based politics (or at least to supplement such methods), *reses partisipatif* are an attractive option. And as the elections loom there is a clear opportunity to convince parliamentarians seeking re-election that participating in this approach will pay political dividends for them as figures recognised for their work in the service of the community.

Mentoring and technical assistance for women candidates is also an option for MAMPU partners in this period, both for incumbents and new entrants. There will be demand for assistance related to campaign methods, messaging, targeting strategies, gender-related issues and so on as female candidates look towards the elections. The activities supported by BAKTI before the 2014 elections could be conducted again, either by BAKTI alone or, ideally, replicated amongst selected other MAMPU partners.

### 5.8.3. Post-election period

The post-election period, in the hiatus between the announcement of results in April and the inauguration in October, there will be opportunities to conduct mentoring and technical assistance for newly-elected women parliamentarians, both first-time and re-elected members. This is a time when formal parliamentary duties have not begun, but new members are orienting themselves to their new roles and open to help. If past patterns are repeated, the great majority of DPR and DPRD members will not be re-elected incumbents but new parliamentarians with no experience in office. This will especially be the case with new women MPs. Experience has shown that well-targeted training and network-building in this period can be effective in establishing relationships for future work with parliamentarians by MAMPU partners. It also provides a clear opening to introduce the thematic issues that MAMPU partners are working on, including concepts such as gender-based budgeting and gender analysis of legislation.

There is another potential opening during the post-election period which is often overlooked. This is when a new parliament has just been elected but the old parliament is still functioning because the new members have not yet been inaugurated. In this hiatus period many politicians are not very active in their parliamentary duties, but it can also be a time when highly focused members of parliament can have unfinished legislation passed quickly because there is potentially less opposition during this politically “quiet time”. An example occurred when the controversial law on legislative institutions (MD3) which was passed by the DPR in July 2014 when most attention was focused on the drama of the presidential contest between Joko Widodo and Subianto Prabowo. In that case the opportunity was exploited as a way to avoid public scrutiny, but this need not be the case. The timing could be made use of by a MAMPU partner in a province or district. For example, if the partner had been working with the local DPRD to have a *perda* passed, but delays had occurred in reaching final agreement because the parliamentary agenda had been too full and/or members were too preoccupied with the election, this might be an

opportune time to get the time and attention of some key parliamentary allies to have the *perda* brought to completion.

#### 5.8.4. The 2019-2024 political cycle

Following the inauguration of the new parliaments in October 2019, the next political cycle will commence. In one sense, this will mean a return to the “normal” political environment for MAMPU. But, as mentioned above, experience shows that this will bring a huge influx of new politicians onto the political stage, necessitating a new round of relationship-building for MAMPU partners. But if partners are active during the pre-election and post-election periods, conducting activities that are valuable for women and gender-supportive candidates and newly-elected parliamentarians, there will be a basis to develop connections. To repeat an earlier emphasis, the extension of *reses partisipatif* to other MAMPU partner areas seems an ideal way to both build connections and maintain a supportive coalition during the election period. The convening of a second parliamentary conference, as recommended in 5.5.1., would be most appropriate at this time.

During this time it will also be essential for MAMPU and its partners to carry out analysis on the new political conditions at the national level and in each province and district where MAMPU partners are active. The character of the new national government and the manoeuvring of parties into coalitions in the DPR has potentially profound implications for advocacy on legislation, the sexual violence bill being a case in point. Similarly, in each region where MAMPU partners are working, there will be a new constellation of forces in the local DPRD. New appointments will be made to DPR/D leaderships and to the leading positions in *komisi*, other committees and *fraksi*. Old champions may not have made it through the election process and replacements will have to be found.

A particular need, and thus opportunity, for MAMPU intervention in the near future is centred on problems originating in the various services under Badan Penyelenggara Jaminan Sosial (BPJS). During interviews with parliamentarians and MAMPU partners conducted for this study there was numerous references to the problems that people had in receiving BPJS services and benefits. These included confusion about what entitlements citizens have under the various BPJS services, how to make use of them and, in particular, the difficulty in obtaining all the documentation required to register. Parliamentarians mentioned that constituents frequently come to them for information about BPJS and how to overcome problems with it. It is clearly a growth area for MPs' work with constituents and is likely to become increasingly so as BPJS and other government services become more widespread. But many parliamentarians and their staff are ill-equipped to deal with the demand for assistance because their own knowledge is limited.

There is a obvious intersection of interests between constituents, parliamentarians and MAMPU partners on the issue. This creates an opportunity for MAMPU engagement with parliamentarians, civil society and government focused on the implementation of BPJS. This could take the form of workshops on BPJS services designed to educate parliamentarians and civil society about the services and entitlements provided by BPJS and how to respond to public inquiries, including which government agency people should be referred to. The objective would be to equip participating parliamentarians with the knowledge required to deal with this growing issue amongst their constituents. It is an



opening for MAMPU partners working on social protection, but it is also a cross-cutting issue that could potentially involve other partners as well.

In terms of timing, the activity would probably be most appropriate in the post-election period and after the new parliament has been inaugurated when the new MPs begin to relate to constituents' issues. Unlike campaign mentoring, which obviously appeals to the personal concerns of candidates in the pre-election period, there would be limited demand in the lead up to the election. Nevertheless it might be feasible to conduct training with community organisations before the elections, with the objective of educating them to lead workshops for parliamentarians after the election.

## 6. Conclusion and recommendations

MAMPU's parliamentary engagement has gone through a process of evolution. Some initial uncertainties were clarified, partners have developed various modes of parliamentary engagement and important successes have been recorded, in terms of both policy outcomes and innovative approaches. In broad terms, MAMPU should maintain its current approach to parliamentary engagement for the final period of the project, with special emphasis on the need to adjust to the challenges and opportunities created by the elections of 2019.

Four inter-related questions have been dealt with by MAMPU and its partners during the evolution of approaches to parliamentary engagement:

- How could the idea of parliamentary work as a second “component” or “stream” be implemented in practice?
- Was MAMPU partly a parliamentary strengthening program?
- Could women's caucuses be the main entry point and partner for parliamentary engagement?
- How would the MAMPU partners that did not have an explicitly parliamentary focus carry out their parliamentary engagement?

These questions were resolved in practice by moving on from the concept of a separate set of parliamentary activities and working with parliamentarians as a channel for voice and influence. Activities with a specifically parliamentary focus, such as mentoring for women parliamentarians and the *reses partisipatif* methodology, became framed as vehicles for influencing parliament in MAMPU's thematic areas. The conception of women's caucuses as the primary parliamentary entry point was also superseded when MAMPU partners began engaging with various committees in the DPR and DPRD and with individual parliamentarians. As partners initiated these parliamentary connections, they developed different modes of engagement that suited their particular strengths and circumstances.

The key point is that MAMPU partners largely drove this evolution and resolved the issues in the process of implementing their various activities. This was a positive outcome because it accords with MAMPU's approach of facilitating rather than directing partners' activities. MAMPU's managing contractor provided strategic direction, including broadening parliamentary engagement to all partners and encouraging sharing of experience. The modes of parliamentary engagement progressed by MAMPU partners have varied from mentoring of women parliamentarians, improving constituent relations, lobbying on national and regional regulations, influencing regional budget allocations, and partnering with parliamentarians to work together with regional government agencies and community organisations on MAMPU

thematic areas. Each of those modes responded to particular needs related to the thematic areas and was shaped by the capabilities and networks of the partner concerned.

There is an interesting and even exciting story to tell about the experience of MAMPU partners in working with parliamentarians. Important contributions have been made to developing the voice and influence of grass-roots community groups to improve access to services by poor women in Indonesia. These contributions have taken the form of changes in the legislative, regulatory and policy environment, in the implementation of those changes and in the relationship between parliamentarians and their constituents. The key challenge ahead is to maintaining the momentum of change, especially applying pressure to make sure that effective implementation happens. MAMPU now also has an opportunity to spread knowledge about how its partners have made an impact, the problems encountered and the approaches developed. Dissemination should happen across MAMPU themes and partners and, more broadly, with the community sector and the political and development worlds.

Against the background of this general conclusion, the following recommendations outline a direction for continued parliamentary engagement until the completion of MAMPU in 2020 and, if further DFAT funding eventuates, for engagement post-MAMPU.

### 6.1. Recommendations

1. MAMPU should broadly continue its current approach to parliamentary engagement in the coming period.
2. Increase attention to sharing of experiences and approaches to parliamentary engagement across themes and partners, with a view to increasing the intensity of outreach to parliamentarians across MAMPU.
3. Integrate cross-partner sharing into planning for the sustainability of partners' parliamentary networks and expertise post-MAMPU.
4. Convene a second parliamentary conference after the 2019 elections to facilitate cross-partner sharing and the consolidation and rebuilding of post-election parliamentary networks. Use the conference deliberations and conclusions to develop and disseminate proposals and guidelines for future parliamentary engagement.
5. Extend the replication of the *reses partisipatif* methodology to a broader range of MAMPU partners and disseminate information about it more widely outside MAMPU.
6. Thinking politically should become a foundational operating principle for MAMPU and its partners as they engage with parliaments. This means analysing the political context within which any given issue is being discussed, identifying parliamentary partners and champions in terms of what can be mutually beneficial to both sides of the relationship – ie. community organisations and parliamentarians – and timing interventions to make the maximum impact as political developments unfold.
7. Make greater use of parliament's oversight powers to increase pressure for implementation of executive government policy decisions and programs, especially where MAMPU partners have successfully supported the creation of legislation/regulations and executive government policy, but where implementation is ongoing.

8. Develop a plan of action for parliamentary engagement as the 2019 elections approach, calibrating activities in the context of the pre-election period from now until the end of 2018, the campaign period from the beginning of 2019 to April 2019, the hiatus period from the election until inauguration of parliament in October 2019 and the new political cycle starting from the inauguration.
9. Develop a program of training for parliamentarians and community groups on BPJS, including the public's entitlement under the scheme, administrative requirements and procedures and the role of the various government agencies involved. In the context of the increasing demands on parliamentarians from constituents about problems with BPJS, such an activity would make use of the intersection of interests between MAMPU partners, parliamentarians and BPJS users/constituents and strengthen knowledge about BPJS amongst parliamentarians and community groups.

## APPENDIX 1

Role of the main actors in each stage of the legislative process and the openings for CSOs and other external bodies to influence the parliamentary actors.

Lawmaking stage	Key actors & their roles	Openings for MAMPU partners' influence	Rating
<b>Preliminary discussion/debate about the need for legislative change on a policy problem</b>	Government ministries & agencies <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most powerful source of policy ideas.</li> <li>• Initiate the majority of successfully passed legislation.</li> <li>• Key actors in policy debates. Can advance or obstruct change.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence officials.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions amongst officials.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive individual officials.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>
	Interest groups (eg poor women, migrant workers) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The interested parties most affected by the issue.</li> <li>• Their organisations mobilise support for change.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gather data on issues &amp; cases.</li> <li>• Participate in public &amp; in-private discussion &amp; debate to gather support for legislation.</li> <li>• Build stakeholder networks &amp; coalitions.</li> <li>• Intervention must be embedded in these groups interests.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>
	Individual MPs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political impetus for legislation.</li> <li>• Advocates for, or obstacles to, change within parliamentary organs – eg <i>komisi</i></li> <li>• Key actors in policy debates.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Use as entry points with other institutions such as parties, parliamentary committee etc.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions amongst them.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive MPs &amp; staff.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>
	CSO community <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Participate in public debate &amp; advocacy on issues &amp; policies.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform &amp; educate other CSOs.</li> <li>• Participate in current debates.</li> <li>• Build networks &amp; coalitions.</li> </ul>	<b>MODERATE IMPORTANCE</b>

	Media <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide coverage on issues &amp; policies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform &amp; educate journalists.</li> <li>• Participate in media debates, talkshows etc.</li> <li>• Mobilise social media.</li> </ul>	MODERATE IMPORTANCE
	Academia/think tanks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Produce research on issues &amp; policies.</li> <li>• Provide input into policy proposals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify supportive academics.</li> <li>• Connect academics/think tanks with policymakers in parliament &amp; government.</li> </ul>	MODERATE IMPORTANCE
	Political parties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political impetus for legislation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lobby for support.</li> <li>• In practice, parties as institutions rarely have developed policy positions (especially at regional level).</li> <li>• May support legislative change in some cases.</li> </ul>	LOW IMPORTANCE
<b>Composition of <i>naskah akademik</i> &amp; draft legislation</b>	In the case of a government draft: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Relevant ministry &amp; Ministry of Law &amp; Human Rights, or</li> <li>• Relevant provincial/district government agency.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>• Provide data, arguments &amp; alternative wording.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions amongst officials.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive individual officials.</li> </ul>	HIGH IMPORTANCE
	In the case of a DPR/DPRD initiative draft: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Komisi</li> <li>• Special Committee</li> <li>• Legislative Committee</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>• Provide data, arguments &amp; alternative wording.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions amongst parliamentarians.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive individual parliamentarians.</li> </ul>	HIGH IMPORTANCE
	<i>Fraksi</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Can provide political support</li> <li>• Rarely, but occasionally, provide substantive input into drafting.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions.</li> </ul>	LOW IMPORTANCE



<b>Deliberation, consultation, amendment &amp; finalisation of draft legislation</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Working committee (<i>panja</i>) &amp; sub-committees (<i>tim perumus, tim sinkronisasi</i>)</li> <li>Government representatives</li> <li><i>Lobi</i> meetings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>Provide data, arguments &amp; alternative wording.</li> <li>Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>Identify supporters &amp; champions amongst them.</li> <li>Build networks of supportive individual parliamentarians.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>
<b>Final approval of legislation</b>	Plenary session <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><i>Fraksi</i> leaders</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Observe proceedings &amp; plan for lobbying action if there is dissension and possible vote (rarely occurs).</li> </ul>	<b>LOW IMPORTANCE</b>

## APPENDIX 2

Roles of the main actors in each stage of the budget deliberation process (APBN and APBD) and the openings for MAMPU partners to influence the parliamentary actors.

Stage in budget process	Key actors & their roles	Openings for MAMPU partners' influence	Rating
<b>Pre-budget planning processes.</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• RPJMN</li> <li>• RPJMD</li> <li>• <i>Musrenbang</i></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• National ministries &amp; non-ministerial agencies</li> <li>• Provincial &amp; district government agencies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence officials.</li> <li>• Lobby for support for budget funding, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions amongst officials.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive individual officials.</li> </ul>	HIGH IMPORTANCE
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Interest groups (eg poor women, migrant workers)</li> <li>• The interested parties most affected by the issue.</li> <li>• Their organisations mobilise support for change.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Gather data on issues &amp; budget funding needs.</li> <li>• Participate in public &amp; in-private discussion &amp; debate to gather support for legislation.</li> <li>• Build stakeholder networks &amp; coalitions.</li> <li>• Intervention must be embedded in these groups' interests.</li> </ul>	HIGH IMPORTANCE
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Individual MPs</li> <li>• Political impetus for budget allocations.</li> <li>• Advocates for, or obstacles to, change within parliamentary organs – eg <i>komisi</i></li> <li>• Key actors in budget debates.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Use as entry points with other institutions such as parties, parliamentary committee etc.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive MPs &amp; staff.</li> </ul>	HIGH IMPORTANCE
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CSO community</li> <li>• Participate in public debate &amp; advocacy on issues &amp; budget proposals.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform &amp; educate.</li> <li>• Participate in current debates.</li> <li>• Build networks &amp; coalitions.</li> </ul>	MODERATE IMPORTANCE

	Media <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provide coverage on budget issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inform &amp; educate journalists.</li> <li>• Participate in media debates, talkshows etc.</li> <li>• Mobilise social media.</li> </ul>	MODERATE IMPORTANCE
	Academia/think tanks <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Produce research on budget-related issues.</li> <li>• Provide input into budget proposals</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify supportive academics.</li> <li>• Connect academics/think tanks with policymakers in parliament &amp; government.</li> </ul>	MODERATE IMPORTANCE
	Political parties <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Political impetus for legislation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lobby for support.</li> <li>• In practice, parties as institutions rarely have developed budget proposals (especially at regional level). Occasional exceptions.</li> <li>• May make budget proposals in some cases.</li> </ul>	LOW IMPORTANCE
<b>Deliberation, consultation, amendment &amp; finalisation of draft budget (APBN &amp; APBD).</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Komisi</i> for each ministerial/OPD budget.</li> <li>• <i>Budget Committee</i> for overall budget.</li> <li>• Government representatives</li> <li>• <i>Lobi</i> meetings</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>• Provide data, arguments &amp; proposals for budget funding.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions amongst parliamentarians &amp; officials.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive individual parliamentarians.</li> </ul>	HIGH IMPORTANCE

### APPENDIX 3

Roles of the main actors in the parliament's oversight function. Oversight is a continuing process, not necessarily linked to a single event such as the passage of a law or regulation.

Stage in oversight process	Key actors & their roles	Openings for MAMPU partners' influence	Rating
<b>Preliminary discussion/debate about the need for parliamentary information and/or action on a government policy, program or other official measure.</b>	Individual MPs <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Advocates for, or obstacles to, raising issues for parliamentary oversight.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>Use as entry points with other institutions such as parties, parliamentary committees etc.</li> <li>Identify supporters &amp; champions.</li> <li>Build networks of supportive MPs &amp; staff.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>
	Interest groups (eg poor women, migrant workers) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>The interested parties most affected by the issue.</li> <li>Their organisations mobilise support for change.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Gather data on cases &amp; systemic issues.</li> <li>Participate in public &amp; in-private discussion &amp; debate to gather support for bringing the issue to parliament.</li> <li>Build stakeholder networks &amp; coalitions.</li> <li>Intervention must be embedded in these groups' interests.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>
	Media <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provide coverage on issues related to government policies, programs &amp; other official measures.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inform &amp; educate journalists.</li> <li>Participate in media debates, talkshows etc.</li> <li>Mobilise social media.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>
	CSO community <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Participate in public debate &amp; advocacy on issues.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Inform &amp; educate.</li> <li>Participate in current debates.</li> <li>Build networks &amp; coalitions.</li> </ul>	<b>MODERATE IMPORTANCE</b>

	<p>Academia/think tanks</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Produce research on issues.</li> <li>• Provide input into framing of parliamentary questions to government.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify supportive academics.</li> <li>• Connect academics/think tanks with policymakers in parliament &amp; government.</li> </ul>	<b>MODERATE IMPORTANCE</b>
<b>Parliamentary oversight questions &amp; investigations</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <i>Komisi</i> in working meetings with counterpart executive agencies.</li> <li>• <i>Pansus</i> conducting investigations into government policies or actions.</li> <li>• Public Accounts Committee (BAKN) analysis of BPK reports (DPR 2019-2024)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>• Provide data on cases &amp; systemic issues &amp; wording of questions to government representatives.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions amongst parliamentarians.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive individual parliamentarians.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>
	<p>Individual MPs</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Raise issues during oversight meetings.</li> <li>• Question government representatives.</li> <li>• Produce reports of investigations.</li> <li>• Raise issues directly with government officials through informal channels.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Educate &amp; influence.</li> <li>• Provide data on cases &amp; systemic issues &amp; wording of questions to government representatives.</li> <li>• Lobby for support, formally &amp; informally.</li> <li>• Use as entry points with other institutions such as parties, parliamentary committees etc.</li> <li>• Identify supporters &amp; champions.</li> <li>• Build networks of supportive MPs &amp; staff.</li> </ul>	<b>HIGH IMPORTANCE</b>



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